On the Dilemma of Preemptive Kidney Transplantation
Editorial Preventive medicine has broadened its scope in recent years. Women have early hysterectomies to preempt uterine and ovarian cancers, some high-risk women are undergoing preventive mastectomies to avoid future breast cancer, and cancer patients are receiving palliative chemotherapy as a preventive measure after surgery to remove seemingly contained tumors.
In this issue of Medical Decision Making, Brand discusses the decision to undergo a preemptive kidney transplantation. His article raises several important issues and contributions both in what it presents and in what it does not. The article focuses only on the individual patient decision. A patient who has deteriorating kidney function (uremia) is expected to progress to end-stage renal disease (ESRD), where the only options to sustain life are dialysis and/or kidney transplantation. Brand presents an analytical result by which a patient who has an available living donor willing to donate a kidney should consider the possibility of early kidney transplantation in the hope of avoiding the poor quality of life associated with ESRD. Such a decision would balance the tradeoffs among the quality of life at the time of the decision, the (mortality) risk of transplantation surgery, graft survival, and the expected quality of life should the transplant fail and the patient need to be sustained on dialysis. The striking consequence of this result, coined by Brand as the &dquo;no-remorse theorem,&dquo; is the total independence of the decision to undergo transplantation of the future rate at which the disease would progress to ESRD.
In short, there is only the need to consider the current burden of the disease relative to the risks of transplantation. If the current burden outweighs the risks, then early transplantation is the recommended choice even if the disease never reaches end stage! One important word of caution as to what should not be inferred from this paper: It does not recommend universal early preemptive transplantation. It recommends transplantation only after the patient's utility function indicates such a preference at the current time. The patient's utility values for the various quality-of-life possibilities are critical. The article underlines the practical importance of building this (subjective) utility function. This is especially relevant and important in light of the recent emergence of consulting services asimed at aiding patients in retrieving information about diseases, therapies, and prognoses and in assessing their preferences for possible outcomes.
In addition to looking at the preferred choice at a given time, the theorem also provides a solution to the optimal timing of a kidney transplant operation. The existence of such unequivocal optimal timing is connected to the aforementioned qualitative result, the &dquo;no-remorse theorem,&dquo;
and is based on the assumption that the status of the native kidneys cannot improve over time. The observation is rather simple: if there is a fixed planning horizon, the outlook of graft survival remains the same over time, and the uremia problems can only get worse (or, more optimistically, remain unchanged), then there is an epoch where there is a balance between the current burden of uremia and the future prospects of engraftment. Beyond the balance point, transplantation will always be preferred. Finding this balance point, on the basis of the patient's utility curve, is the key to optimal timing. Models that address the timing of kidney transplantation have appeared in the literature,2 but Brand's article is one of the few' that undertake the subjective utility perspective.
Although the article makes a very important methodologic contribution, we have to remember that the issue of preemptive transplantation is relevant for only a rather limited population: patients who have a living related donor and who possess a rather optimistic outlook for their quality of life should the graft fail. Brand discusses in detail the exact assumptions that underlie his results.
Brand mentions possible extensions to preemptive coronary bypass surgery and other preemptive organ transplants for degenerative diseases. This approach could also be used to address such timing problems as: when should patients begin protease inhibitor therapy for HIV, when should patients begin antiviral therapy for hepatitis C, and when should patients get knee replacements for progressive osteoarthritis? We now examine a few further issues raised by such possibilities in the context of organ transplantation.
In the case of kidney transplantation, graft failure implies continuation on dialysis and possible future transplantation. In the case of chronic progressive liver or heart disease, if the patient receives an organ transplant, graft failure has grave consequences for the patient. Of course, in both these cases, a living related donor is out of the question. If cadaver hearts and livers were available to meet all demand, then early preemptive transplantation could be a viable option. In these circumstances it makes no sense to think about the quality of life after graft failure, since there is no life to talk about. Brand's results could still be relevant with the right interplay of the other parameters. Heart and liver transplants offer a hypothetically much more difficult choice problem because of the lack of recourse following graft failure.
If we return to kidney disease, we realize that cadaver kidneys could potentially present a related decision situation, especially if there were to be an abundance of cadaver kidneys for transplantation.
Moreover, under current conditions, where kidneys are scarce, allowing preemptive transplantation based on a patient's subjective utilities could trigger serious ethical and societal dilemmas. If the patient's utility functions enter into the prioritization score for transplantation, we run the risk of having patients misrepresent their preferences in hopes of getting higher priority. This highlights the problematic nature of considering subjective preferences in the allocation of scarce public goods, not to mention such broader issues as costs or logistics.
Transplantation lists may also be affected by another facet of early preemptive (living donor) transplantation. If patients were to receive transplants at earlier stages of renal failure, some of them would experience transplant failure and be placed on the cadaver transplant list (rather than on dialysis only). This would have implications for other patients already on that list. How should transplant centers factor all patients' interests into the preemptive transplant decision?
A key assumption of Brand's analysis is that the patient's condition will not improve over time. This does not allow for possible technologic innovation. If such innovation were to improve the patient's prospects for continuing to live with a native kidney, the basic assumption might no longer hold, and nei-ther would the &dquo;no-remorse theorem.&dquo; This makes intuitive sense because if technologic innovation is a possibility, it may be worthwhile to &dquo;ride out&dquo; the disease as long as possible in hope of benefiting from the innovation. Still, there are many ethical implications to these situations, and further research is needed to estimate the extent and likelihood of technologic innovation.
Finally, Brand's article was written from an individual's perspective. It could have interesting impli-
